The self does not have agency. The self is a model of the mind’s agency: it does not make but documents decisions, for learning and communication. That’s why the self is tied to the experience of volition. (The self is also a model of what the mind experiences and how it reacts.)
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I agree. In his terms, the split between Res Ext and Res Cog exists only in Res Cog. In my terms, the split exists in a deeper monism of 'Res Aesthetica'. The monism isnt truly 'neutral' IMO, because it is aesthetic (metaphenomenological), not physical or logical (anesthetic).
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You start from a phenomenological dualism, go to a representational monism, and try to somehow jump to an ontological dualism (for which you don't have evidence after explaining phen.) that is then merged again in a substrate monism, where "aesthetic" is defined in vaguest terms?
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I think, therefore I am seems to be either trivially circular or a trivial category error, depending on whether I is a constant or a variable. But as a an experiential description, cogito ergo sum works well.
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I agree as a typical human experience the cogito works well, but non-ordinary states of consciousness make me hesitate to generalize it.
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