Some people, like Christof Koch, think that a simulation cannot become conscious. The irony is that only simulations can be conscious. Consciousness is a simulated property of a simulated system.
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Replying to @Plinz
what is your criterion to tell apart a simulated system from a... also, what's the opposite of a simulated system?
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Replying to @umruehren
The ground truth has an actually implemented transition function. A simulacrum can only be described as if it did. I think that is what the difference comes down to. Most models are simulacra.
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Replying to @Plinz
Is this about levels of description? Every system ultimately runs on the ground truth transition function, so nothing is a simulation, but if we don't impose functional subsystem-boundaries we're lost -- and yours is: consciousness is computational, substrate is a distraction?
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Replying to @umruehren @Plinz
The question of a simulation is one of observability. A simulation is observable from the outside, but cannot observe the outside. This means the effective transition function of a simulation is the one needed to explain its observable transitions, not the ground truth one.
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Still grappling with the boundary of effect though. Intuitively there is a difference between a simulated agent affecting the outside, and the outside observing the simulation and acting based on the observations, but a differentiation should not rely on any notion of intent.
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Eventually a simulation is not an ontological category, but a certain mode of describing a system. Typically we characterize simulations as representational re-enactments of emergent dynamics produced by a different ground truth.
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