I think Thomas would be comfortable with Charlie.
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Replying to @matthew_d_green @tqbf and
I would like to add to this thread one thing: do not underestimate the arbitrariness by which people get called on to testify at Senate hearings. A careful, anaconda-like law enforcement agenda on encryption would be much better than the reality, which is most likely rule of derp
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I think it’s good to avoid being a knowing instrument of derp and derp theatre. Which is what today was.
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Replying to @matthew_d_green @tqbf and
I'd be interested to know what you would have said in that context (I'm still working on an interminable article on this) that you feel was misleading or elided in the written statements or testimony. I realize that's a make-work tweet so please feel free to ignore
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Some of what he said is right. But then he claims that CSAM scanning can he moved to the client in an offhand way, says we can do device encryption backdoors (“though with difficulty”), and his view on wiretapping is undefined except that 0days are currently sufficient.
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Replying to @matthew_d_green @tqbf and
The device encryption part of the debate seems the one where everyone is in closest agreement on what an implementation would look like (some flavor of key escrow), and the argument is really about policy and tradeoffs.
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In the sense that a person screaming things should not be on a panel, it is a joke. But on the subtance, I seriously believe that client-side CESM detection, end-to-end encrypted messaging and device backdoors are dissimilar issues
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