Jeremy Stangroom

This is where standpoint theory inevitably ends up - identity becomes an epistemological trump card. (And this is why standpoint theory is not postmodern, because postmodernism allows no grounds to privilege one standpoint over another).https://twitter.com/lillydancyger/status/1008838121197273088 …

It's true that most standpoint theorists argue that standpoint theory is objectivist, ie, that there are social facts, and that people who occupy subordinated social positions have privileged epistemic access to the unjust social reality in which they are subordinated.

They also claim that members of groups that are privileged have an epistemic disadvantage.

The worry here, ofc, is how do you justify your claim your group is subordinated and therefore epistemically privileged, if we are all susceptible to these epistemic limitations? It seems to me we need an objective standpoint outside standpoints to evaluate competing claims.

I've written about this exact issue: http://www.philosophersmag.com/opinion/7-the-antinomies-of-privilege …

They also argue that merely occupying a position is not sufficient for insight: you also need theoretical/hermeneutical resources through which to interpret your experience. If those resources are grounded in universally accessible facts/reasons, can support claim to standpoint?