But the failure of one person (however prominent) is not similar to the failure of most people who subscribe to a moral system.
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Replying to @svenosaurus
So, for example, Bertie Russell, who advocated for free love, but was unable to handle the free love of his second wife, Dora. I think that does tell you something about the problems of free love, not as a matter of logical necessity, but even so...
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Replying to @PhilosophyExp
I agree when that is based on observation of many people (and I agree that there’s such evidence in this case). I disagree that just Russell’s example is informative. Consider two hypothetical examples: 1/
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Replying to @svenosaurus @PhilosophyExp
A: an anti-child-molesting crusader turns out to be a child molester. B: an anti-homosexuality crusader turns out to be gay. While we may consider both of them hypocrites, I don’t see why their stories would inform our opinions on principles they represent. 2/
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Replying to @svenosaurus @PhilosophyExp
I would say A stood for the right principle and B stood for the wrong principle, whether I knew what they personally did or not. That A is a criminal and B merely a hypocrite certainly doesn’t undermine A’s principle more than B’s. 3/3
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Replying to @svenosaurus
Hang on a minute, you're talking about principles qua principles, but my response was - "The failure of somebody to live up to their own moral system can certainly be evidence against *the theory of human nature* upon which the system is built."
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Replying to @PhilosophyExp @svenosaurus
And I was taking seriously both the words *can* & the idea of evidence rather than logical necessity. Bertrand Russell's failure doesn't tell you anything abt the principles underpinning free love, except it suggests, given what we know about his life, they're hard to live up to.
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Replying to @PhilosophyExp @svenosaurus
If your response is that one person's life can't tell us anything about that sort of thing - I think that's not right. We can know enough about a person's life to make a judgement about whether they're likely to be psychological outliers.
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Replying to @PhilosophyExp @svenosaurus
Of course that means we have to know something about other people so we can make a judgement about whether a particular person is psychologically unusual, but we don't have to know how lots of other people have lived up to the particular moral injunction under consideration.
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Replying to @PhilosophyExp @svenosaurus
Even in the difficult example of your child molester I think it does tell us certain sorts of things (e.g., compulsion isn't easily resisted, it won't be wildly unusual in the population at large, etc), some of which might have moral implications in terms of how we handle it, etc
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Again, not as a matter of logical necessity - you can't rule out the possibility that the particular person is unique - but as a matter of abductive inference.
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Replying to @PhilosophyExp
All fair points. I don’t really disagree, except that we probably have different degrees of trust in evidence based on individual cases.
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