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[New Report] How countries attempt to block Signal Private Messenger App around the world
https://ooni.org/post/2021-how-signal-private-messenger-blocked-around-the-world/ …
Our research report shares OONI data & analysis on the blocking of @signalapp in #Iran, #China, #Cuba and #Uzbekistan.
#censorship #oonipic.twitter.com/SNVi7v6twV
In April 2021, we released a new OONI Probe test for measuring the blocking of the Signal Private Messenger App: https://ooni.org/nettest/signal
Since then, OONI community members tested @signalapp worldwide every day, contributing measurements as open data: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-10-23&since=2021-09-23&test_name=signal …pic.twitter.com/KVSKWcBPkz
We analyzed all Signal measurements collected from around the world between April 2021 to September 2021.
During this period, we found that the testing of @signalapp primarily presented signs of blocking in #Iran, #China, #Cuba, and #Uzbekistan.pic.twitter.com/bZOyP7VhwO
In #Iran, the testing of @signalapp consistently presented signs of blocking on at least 32 AS networks.
On many networks, the block appears to be performed at a DNS level by returning the IP address 10.10.34.35, which is commonly used to serve the Iranian blockpage.pic.twitter.com/tBf3Xokmrj
In #China, @signalapp was tested on 28 AS networks, consistently presenting signs of blocking on most networks.
China appears to block Signal by means of bidirectional DNS injection, as DNS queries from outside the country also result in injected responses.pic.twitter.com/eP2NMGrt9i
In #Cuba, @signalapp was temporarily blocked in mid-July 2021 amid anti-government protests.
Measurements show that the TLS handshake to the Signal backend service failed consistently with a connection_reset error, indicating the use of DPI targeting the SNI field.pic.twitter.com/dIrmIIo5PM
In #Uzbekistan, the testing of @signalapp presented signs of blocking on 8 AS networks.
When attempting to perform a TLS handshake to all Signal backend services, the connection constantly times out after writing the first data packet to the network, indicating the use of DPI.pic.twitter.com/i1QQyfQ3Mp
Circumvention is enabled by default for @signalapp users in Iran, Egypt, Oman, Qatar & the UAE.
Signal users in other countries can:
• iOS -> Enable the “Censorship Circumvention” setting
• Android -> Use Signal TLS proxies:https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360056052052-Proxy-Support …
You can help Android @signalapp users circumvent blocking (if they have a phone number which is not from Iran, Egypt, Oman, Qatar & the UAE) by:
1. Running a Signal TLS proxy: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-TLS-Proxy …
2. Sharing the mobile deep link: https://signal.tube/# <your_host_name>
You can also help monitor the blocking of @signalapp by running OONI Probe (https://ooni.org/install/ ) and contributing measurements (https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-10-23&since=2021-09-23&test_name=signal …) as open data. 
pic.twitter.com/9oZtwe6lYW
We thank OONI Probe users who contributed measurements, supporting this study. 
We also thank @signalapp for their tireless efforts in bringing end-to-end encryption to the masses worldwide. 
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