More generally, deflationary shock during crisis unexpectedly redistributed purchasing power to creditors. Interventions that reversed this effect could be interpreted as completing missing insurance markets.
-
-
-
That was my thought...
-
Great review of his article.
-
Danke.
End of conversation
New conversation -
-
-
I think people need to read the link, not just your tweet
-
Pretty much always true, and yet... :-)
End of conversation
New conversation -
-
-
If we bailed out homeowners, then there'd be too many homeowners. This has already happened with bankers.

-
How do you know how many is too many?
- 1 more reply
New conversation -
-
-
No, bailing out only the bankers was the right call. Bailing out people who relied on the assurances of experts that its would be OK would foster gross irresponsibility on the part of borrowers. Bailing out the people who destroyed the global economy was necessary to rebuild.
Thanks. Twitter will use this to make your timeline better. UndoUndo
-
-
-
It is a truth universally acknowledged that bail outs are only for Wall Street. It is called “ Banking on the State”.
Thanks. Twitter will use this to make your timeline better. UndoUndo
-
-
-
GDP would have



Thanks. Twitter will use this to make your timeline better. UndoUndo
-
-
-
We did, with the Home Affordable Refinance Program
-
And it was the homeowner bailouts that originally fermented the Tea Partyhttps://www.cnbc.com/video/2015/02/06/santellis-tea-party-rant-february-19-2009.html …
End of conversation
New conversation -
-
-
This was a very complicated problem that wasn’t as easy to fix, even if you wrote down principal on the first lien and gave a market based 30 year fix payment, the total PITI cost of the home would have been too much still
- 1 more reply
New conversation -
-
-
I read this article based on your tweet, and it doesn't seem to me that the authors show what they say they do. I'm not an econometrician, so I 'm curious whether I'm missing something. 1/4
-
HAMP principal reduction (PR) had a threshold for PR of LTV = 115 & no HAMP PR mod could take a borrower below LTV = 115. So at LTV = 115 HAMP PR and HAMP mods were the same, generating ΔNPV = 0. (Note that authors drop all ΔNPV==0 observations, p. 12.)
-
As LTV increases, PR under HAMP PR increases, generating ΔNPV < or > 0. Given that as ΔNPV converges to 0, principal reduction does too, does it actually make sense to use a regression discontinuity test to ask “what is the effect of principal reduction at the ΔNPV cutoff?” 3/4
-
What am I missing here? Does this sound to you like a correct way to use a regression discontinuity test? 4/4
-
Maybe another way to state this is: Shouldn't a graph like this be a sign that maybe there's a problem with regression discontinuity analysis around ΔNPV = 0? (Note that is from App. A Figure 4.)pic.twitter.com/oH9SGKbHFS
End of conversation
New conversation -
Loading seems to be taking a while.
Twitter may be over capacity or experiencing a momentary hiccup. Try again or visit Twitter Status for more information.