I chose the first. In Habermas's framework moral claims correspond to imperative speech acts ("do this") while fact claims correspond to assertions, but we use assertive language, especially the conditional, to augment our moral vocabulary, turning imperatives into assertions...
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So I don't really believe in moral facts strictly speaking but I do believe in valid moral claims, namely imperatives that correspond to an actual norm. But norms are inter-subjective rather than mind independent
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which is in turn distinct from just an opinion. Rather norms are inherently a product of communities and social practices. They're like rules in a game. It's a fact that bishops can only move diagonally, but only because the community of chess players enforce it as the norm.
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Hmm, this also would have led me to pick the second option
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I took your question as asking about the epistemological status of moral claims rather than the metaphysical status. I don't think ethics is somehow etched into the universe. That's moral naturalism, which is separable from moral realism. Could call me a non-natural moral realistpic.twitter.com/hpc0YQeuX3
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It took me sixty seconds before settling on the second option as closest to what I believe. "Opinion" is not the word I would have used.
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My forte in university philosophy was metaethics, and after having a few beers I frequently long for those undergrad-dorm-room discussions from a decade ago.
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