Nick Szabo  🔑

You don't need *everyone* to distinguish and disagree with the attacker. The market will appropriately value each fork.

Exactly. A chain where innocent validators get deleted will be worth much less than a chain where the attacker gets deleted.

It will often not work out that way. I recommend reading the public choice literature on this kind of topic.

Have a reference to start at? Seems this is mostly about the effectiveness of market pricing. No traditional political mechanism is involved

See also lit about conflicts of interest between stakeholders in a corporation, from their various equity stakes and side contracts.

This is by far the best piece introduction reading on Public Choice theory. Thanks to the amazing @iealondon https://iea.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/IEA%20Public%20Choice%20web%20complete%2029.1.12.pdf …

Economics of centralized political systems may be somewhat relevant, but where is the "decentralized public choice" literature?

For (a), safety faults are uniquely attributable, for liveness faults there are various heuristics that can subjectively determine them.

For (b), if the users approve of what the attacker is doing, then are they really an attacker? Customer is king.

This means EEA is king. Startup dapps which once made ethereum great will flock to ETC if corporate rulers rule

Hence ETH price would drop greatly from an attack on the chain made to satisfy EEA objectives, hence validators have incentive to oppose it.