Cannot be assumed that attacker is economically motivated
-
Show me an exchange that lets you to do that with 94,504 BTC i.e. one Billion US dollars. Remember, exchange deals are off chain. OTC deals are even worse because they are private but parties know each other. Give me a break.
Great so now we are going to rely on exchange security, like the users of Mt. Gox etc. etc. etc. etc. did, but for making claims about the irreversibility of BItcoin itself? Idiotic.
-
-
My point was simply that using the funds within the TX to fund to attack does not make sense. Overly complicated way of attacking the chain. Third party causing havoc for a high value block is a completely separate thing.
-
I am serious here. What is the description of a realistic attack vector of double spending 94k BTC and using that for a chain reorg and not getting caught by leveraging the exchanges? Remember, you need to pay the miners to contribute as well. I am listening.
-
In your scenario is it possible to acquire a sizeable short position without KYC?
-
Tell me where to get such a short postion from without KYC. From the asset side it would only take like Satoshi or another OG to decide to kill it all through early mined coins (which these were not, they were having low UTXO age).
-
Ok. IMO it is more interesting to analyze bitcoin security without reliance on out-of-protocol assumptions (eg impossible to obtain sizeable short position without KYC, impossible to rent significant HP). Because those assumptions may not always apply. But to each their own
-
The world with its realities exist as SN wrote about 51% attack. BTC security does allow that double spend, but the realities do not make it feasible, especially with the current hash rate cost. I see no way to use this TX to reorg it since it cannot be used profitably.
End of conversation
New conversation -
Loading seems to be taking a while.
Twitter may be over capacity or experiencing a momentary hiccup. Try again or visit Twitter Status for more information.