I was assuming that already, but he can't replay coinbase transactions. These coins and their ancestors will definitely be destroyed, causing havoc in the network.
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Replying to @hasufl @nic__carter and
those can only be spend 100 blocks after mined. So for a 200 block reorg we are talking about 100*12.5 = 1250 BTC ~$12.500.000 I am aware that IN THEORY those missing UTXOs can block an unlimited amount of total tx. In practice this seems unlikely.
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Replying to @koeppelmann @nic__carter and
So you think Bitcoin nodes would accept a reorg more than a couple days deep? The recent Binance incident implies otherwise. There was immediate support, incl. from core devs, to reject that reorg which wasn't even a day deep and not coming from a hostile entity.
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Replying to @hasufl @koeppelmann and
At this point one is relying on trusted third parties rather than the protocol. A dangerous thing to do, it cuts into Bitcoin's value prop. Frequent de-reorgs provide another, even easier vector of attack.
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Replying to @NickSzabo4 @koeppelmann and
Nick, I know you've been away from Twitter for a few months but did you hear about the Binance hack and their idea to bribe miners to take these funds instead (a "scorched earth policy" to reject future theft)? What are your thoughts on that?
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Replying to @hasufl @NickSzabo4 and
It wasn’t “their idea” and it was knocked down because it was irresponsible to encourage a stressed out CEO to run a $100B experiment with no research
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Replying to @udiWertheimer @NickSzabo4 and
I agree that it was bad advice, but that's beside the point. You can either think that Bitcoin can (and should) manually reject reorgs of a certain depth, or you can think that reorgs shouldn't be rejected, in which case the good guys can also use them - but probably not both.
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Replying to @hasufl @udiWertheimer and
In case it's not clear I support rejecting deep reorgs and allowing more shallow reorgs (and re-reorgs). What's allowed and what isn't is for the social layer to decide (because *technically*, all reorgs of all colors are allowed.)
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Replying to @hasufl @NickSzabo4 and
I’m not sure if a theoretical reorg would’ve worked but I’m sure that this one wouldn’t have happened. It was proposed many hours into the theft, with zero infrastructure in place for miners to detect the proposed rewards from Binance. It was impractical, yet messy
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Replying to @udiWertheimer @hasufl and
Fair point, though I think
@TamasBlummer raised a good point in his ep with me: we should anticipate that exchanges and miners could set up infrastructure to communicate this faster in future. Not advocating it, but recognising that they may do ithttps://stephanlivera.com/episode/73/2 replies 1 retweet 6 likes
Control of network bottlenecks and thoroughfares is very important consideration. Controlling important network bottlenecks would allow an attacker to reorg on part of the network with substantially less than 51% of the total network.
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