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Ethan might be on to something here. The <1/3 dishonest node limitation in BFT consensus relies on the attackers ability to selectively choose which nodes to lie to. But if you gave the nodes the ability to spawn anonymous Sybil identities, could we bring the limit down to <1/2?https://twitter.com/emacbrough/status/1055221463249149952 …
I think it's fair to say if all this does is inflate the # of identities by 10x, it would have solved nothing. But the partitioning attack relies on the attacker selectively lying to one group and not the other. The key is to remove the ability to distinguish between partitions.
So if you control 4 identities in the network, Szabo1 Szabo2 Szabo3 Szabo4 and I'm trying to partition the network and lie to the group you're in, but I don't know they're all you, I may end up telling the truth to Szabo1 while lying to 2, 3 & 4. @emacbrough feel free to correct.
Good point, I forgot to explain what I was thinking of for the pseudonym authentication mechanism. The general idea would be to use m copies of a unique-signature group signature scheme (i.e., each node can only produce a single valid signature, but no one can tell which 1/2
signature corresponds to which node). Although it's also worth pointing out that the attacker gaining extra Sybils only hurts efficiency anyway, not security. 2/2
So the idea is when you send out your pseudonyms, those intro messages would contain your unique group sig.
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