Nevin Climenhaga

@NevinClimenhaga

Philosopher. Interests: knowledge, probability, explanation, rationality, science, goodness, God. Published in: Mind, Nous, JPhil, PPR, PhilStudies, PoS.

Vrijeme pridruživanja: veljača 2017.

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    31. sij

    The Structure of Epistemic Probabilities

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    This is how I’m starting all my e-mails from now on

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  4. Looking forward to Season 7 of The Crown so I can finally understand Brexit.

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  5. I only think in ordered triples, the first of which is everything I know, the second of which is a proposition I'm considering, and the third of which is a number between 0 and 1. Isn't everyone like this?

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  6. They represent mind-independent relations of explanatory priority that help determine the values of probabilities.

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  9. On my view probabilities are neither beliefs nor frequencies, but a priori relations between propositions. Explanatory relations, formalized in Bayes nets, help determine probabilistic relations. Clarity here can help us apply Bayes nets correctly.

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  10. Sometimes practitioners make philosophical errors. e.g., Pearl says in Causality (p. 2) that probability is subjective confidence: "probabilities encode degrees of belief about events in the world." But on pp. 83-85 (cancer/smoking case), probabilities are given by frequencies.

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  11. My thesis is in keeping with applications of by researchers like . But AFAIK, none of them have explicitly defended the above view about the structure of probabilities. I hope my work can provide a philosophical underpinning to applications of .

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  12. What determines the values of basic probabilities remains a hard problem. But my view helps us evaluate candidate answers like the Principle of Indifference by guiding our application of them. (And many criticisms of Indifference turn on misguided applications of it.)

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  13. Once we have the basic probabilities, we can ask how their values are determined. e.g., perhaps the principle of indifference helps determine them: we assign a flat distribution over a variable V conditional on its parents if they are indifferent over different values of V.

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  14. (What about when we don't know what the correct is? We make basic probabilities relative to a network; and construct a higher-order network over possible first-order networks. This lets us do ; different first-order networks make different predictions.)

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  15. I argue that we need to start by dividing the world into variables, and ordering these variables into a by explanatory priority. The basic probabilities are then the probability of a variable conditional on its parents (= its direct influences).

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  16. Carnap thought the unconditional probabilities of complete worlds were basic. This is a natural view to take from Kolmogorov's axiomatization of probability. But it doesn't fit well with inductive learning, ordinary probabilistic reasoning, causal interventions, etc.

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  17. The probability of A given B -- P(A|B) -- is the degree to which B supports A. But where do probabilities come from? Some probabilities are derivative: their values depend on other probabilities. Others are basic: their values do not depend on other probabilities.

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  18. 31. sij

    My latest in Philosophical Studies: "The Structure of Epistemic Probabilities." I explore how explanatory priority relations (formalized in ) help determine the values of probabilities.

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  19. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    28. sij

    What Skeptics Keep Getting Wrong and Why it's Important (Dr. Nevin Climenhaga)

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  20. 27. sij

    I'll be going live with in two hours (8:00 pm CST/9:00 pm EST) to talk about probability and God. Check it out!

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  21. 27. sij

    CORRECTION: The interview is at 8:00 pm CST, not EST. It's at 9:00 pm EST.

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