Voit lisätä twiitteihisi sijainnin, esimerkiksi kaupungin tai tarkemman paikan, verkosta ja kolmannen osapuolen sovellusten kautta. Halutessasi voit poistaa twiittisi sijaintihistorian myöhemmin. Lue lisää
1. Here's our @NYTmag piece from Herat: what happens when the pandemic comes to a country mired in armed conflict, political instability, and deep poverty?
Photographs: @kianahayeri
(I'll be sharing some observations & field notes in this thread later)https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/22/magazine/afghanistan-coronavirus.html …
2. The most obvious reality casting shadow on efforts to tackle Covid-19 in Afghanistan: the war sucking up all the resources. In the 2 weeks we were following this story, the Taliban carried out about 500 attacks in 9 provinces worst hit by Covid-19. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/22/magazine/afghanistan-coronavirus.html …pic.twitter.com/WVnjyjGb41
3. We actually went to Herat with a sense of optimism -- the gov in Kabul was saying things were under control. What we found was a scarily huge gap between "role-model management" Kabul was proclaiming and a system -- long corrupt, complacent & dependent -- totally overwhelmed.pic.twitter.com/zmj56Bq0VR
4. Kabul was talking about the millions of $$ sent to Herat right away as emergency money. In Herat, there was no capacity to spend. And: for weeks after the $$ was dispatched, officials couldn't tap into it - stuck in trying to ease the overly centralized procurement processes
5. In Kabul, the gov, in slick videos & graphics, announced the new hospital (100 beds, hugely impressive, even VIP rooms) was erected in 18 days and “delivered for use”. We visited a week later -- it was empty; no beds. Officials in Herat didn't know of a plan for staffing it.pic.twitter.com/9AFxXrM1Tw
6. Compared to even Kabul, the lockdown in Herat felt non-existent — very different from what officials had showed on their Facebooks. Many shops were closed. But there were traffic jams & side-walks were packed. As one official told us: "we disrupted the economy, not the virus.”pic.twitter.com/iiJEcM08Hp
7. President Ghani was alarmed by the vulnerability of Afghanistan very very early. He took Covid-19 seriously (he actually lives for tackling these kind of challenges, getting into the weeds of it). Yet, he was too undermined already by his own politics for this crucial moment.
8. The main fight for Ghani's inner circle -- between blame-game for the expensive narrow election victory & disagreement on shares of new gov -- was Abdullah. So much so that Ghani seriousness on Covid-19 was undermined right away: packing 1000s people into Arg for inauguration
9. The minister of health -- hard-working, but stuck in regular clashes with his deputies -- has been running a health sector for decades subcontracted to NGOs for even its most basic services around the country. He was, all of a sudden, asked to make sure government is in lead.
10. If you look at the current basic health services around the Afghanistan, most of it is implemented by NGOs. In this reality, President Ghani and his VP Saleh basically asked UN, WHO etc to take a back seat -- essentially asking that health ministry to step up overnight.pic.twitter.com/ne2P8PsoXX
11. President Ghani's feelings about the UN's inefficiency has never been secret -- he has often lashed out at them in meetings. But their position also felt in response to the US using aid as pressure tactic -- Ghani and Saleh made this about a show of ability and sovereignty.
12. It created a bizarre, disconnected reality. In Kabul, Vice President Saleh said "don’t need WHO to show my nation how to wash their hands ". In Herat, for days the labs had stopped because they had run out of RNA extraction tubes and were at mercy of...you guessed it: WHO.pic.twitter.com/Ermj7ffaO5
13. In the early days, the people donated generously. They continue to some extent. But their generosity has limits in the face of what lies ahead -- months of economic uncertainty.https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/world/asia/coronavirus-afghanistan-kindness.html …
14. There are certain things the central gov has got on with urgency & succeeded in to a good extent: such as making sure the flow of goods into the markets of a land-locked country continue, to make sure rising food prices can be controlled to an extent to avoid a food crisis.
15. That Afghanistan would struggle with a pandemic challenging even the most sophisticated countries is no surprise. What is, however, quite dangerous is the gap between what authorities seem to be believing at the top - and the reality on the ground.https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/22/magazine/afghanistan-coronavirus.html …
16. To counter all evidence for covid-19 spread (in absence of testing to detect), officials hold onto one fact: why such low fatality rates then? A fair point. No one quite seems to have good answer -- "the grace of god". But way too early to use that as self-congratulation.
17. And finally: Perhaps there's a deeper realization embedded in the Ghani-Saleh gambling on trying to majorly shift at a time of crisis how things are done -- that in the face of a threat like Covid-19, the existing system, dependent and complacent, is helpless anyway.
18. So they appear more focussed on how strong a state they can pull from what could be a Covid-19 disaster anyway -- "to cement the bonds of solidarity with our fellow citizens & build enduring trust," as President Ghani wrote in a paper for discussion with intl. partners.
For the rest, read our @NYTmag cover-story for this Sunday.
Afghanistan's Next War: What happens when the pandemic comes to a country mired in conflict?
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/22/magazine/afghanistan-coronavirus.html …pic.twitter.com/3W3POXZDHr
Twitter saattaa olla ruuhkautunut tai ongelma on muuten hetkellinen. Yritä uudelleen tai käy Twitterin tilasivulla saadaksesi lisätietoja.
