The Repugnant Conclusion problem is basically an arithmetic error. I should write up my take on this but never will.
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at its most basic it’s about the trade-off between existence (above some threshold) and well-being
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Replying to @literalbanana @St_Rev and
which seems fair to me, at least to think about
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It's a bad way to think about it, in that the death of an existing person is meaningful in a way the nonexistence of a hypothetical person is not. This should be obvious if you try to reverse the steps in Parfit's argument!
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Replying to @sonyasupposedly @sonyaellenmann and
This just doesn't seem viable in almost any plausible future of digital minds. It requires you to see vast well functioning civilisations of trillions of happy minds as terrible endless tragedies (& not see the same re: e.g. humans today shutting down daily during sleep).
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Replying to @sonyasupposedly @sonyaellenmann and
Well, today, people are born once then live as a single thread until they die. But digital minds can be paused, saved, restored, forked, run fast or slow. When a mind is backed up, are they 'currently alive'? Are you obliged to restore & run them? When? How fast? How many times?
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Replying to @jprwg @sonyaellenmann and
If there's a backup of Alice from yesterday but she's still running today, is restoring & running the backup creating a new person? If yes, would it still be if Alice_1 wasn't still running? If she'd been run, then stopped? What separates current minds from new in such a world?
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why do we count "capable of feeling pain", but not "capable of feeling joy" ?
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