I do not believe, but can understand / have respect for the argument that the fetus slowly transitions from 0 moral worth to full moral worth I will defend "no abortions on day 2" intellectually, but have no emotional angst at idea of RU-486 at that point
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I have zero tolerance for "nuh uh, it's not <BAD THING> ... because. Now shut up." I respect a lot "yes, it is bad thing, let's grapple with it..." problem is, there's a mode that apes that second one: "I want to do X, so, uh, I've 'grappled with it'...and now I get to! WOO!"
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The Repugnant Conclusion problem is basically an arithmetic error. I should write up my take on this but never will.
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I'd love to read it.
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Ultracompressed version: Parfit's steps of 'seems no worse than'/'seems better than' etc. just demonstrate inconsistencies in the idea of 'seeming' without a situated 'seemer', ie a 'for who?'
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Replying to @St_Rev @OG_Jaybird and
And in particular, I've never seen anyone demonstrate that there's any meaningful moral commensurability between worldstates in which person X exists, and worldstates in which X doesn't. (This is also the problem with Benatar's antinatalism argument.)
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Replying to @St_Rev @OG_Jaybird and
Majestically summoning and banishing people to and from the void is something philosophers love to do but not something that seems likely to come up in applications.
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most philosophers WISH they had that ability IRL, I suspect...
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