Has anyone written a good essay on how Solomonoff priors affect the simulation hypothesis?
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Replying to @The_Lagrangian
Solomonoff priors look for shortest program that generates observation- just sim is necessarily simpler than full desc of simulating system
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Replying to @The_Lagrangian
However, the prior is potentially counterbalanced by exponentially greater sims in a universe able to produce many sims
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Replying to @The_Lagrangian
@The_Lagrangian Also have to account for complexity of locating *you* (complexity is observer-centric). So simulation is less probable. Ithk1 reply 1 retweet 0 likes -
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Replying to @The_Lagrangian
@The_Lagrangian I'm saying the increased count doesn't count for much, because it's always counter-balanced by "harder to locate me here".1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @FrameOfStack
@The_Lagrangian It depends how you handle anthropic reasoning. But if you just use straight Solomonoff, I think simulation is improbable.2 replies 1 retweet 0 likes -
Replying to @FrameOfStack
@FrameOfStack have you/other ppl read Bostrom's book on anthropic reasoning? is it good?1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes -
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Replying to @FrameOfStack
@The_Lagrangian I think that if we exist both in and out of a sim, then it's incorrect to give a probability that we're the ones in the sim.6 replies 0 retweets 1 like
@FrameOfStack @The_Lagrangian Some guess maximizes cookies:specks across all of your copies in and out of the ontological stack in question.
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