Zilliqa is using both. The PoW mechanisms is used to elect the PBFT validators. While cool it inherits the security vulnerabilities of both systems. One being we know who the PBFT leaders are and can DDoS them.
I see your point. Fibre isn't required but we'd have more re-orgs & likely more centralized mining without it. Yet, this isn't the same as being able to DDoS known validators.
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Validators can communicate with each other over a private network which makes DDoS impossible. For public networks you can use FIBRE-style IP address whitelists or BGP flowspec.
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You could also rate limit inbound traffic by both IP & Protocol to help mitigate DDoS. Private network would need to be out of band maybe over 4G backup. Well funded adversaries, with access to zero days, targeting validators would still be problematic.
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If you have any great links arguing for PBFT over Nakamoto consensus, based on overall security of the system, please send them my way. Thank you.
End of conversation
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