Choice of circumscription assumptions is a key form of *meta-rational* reasoning. That is: deciding what will count as relevant is a major part of determining *how* rationality will be applied in a particular situation.
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So, to summarize my understanding of
@everytstudies’s analysis of the Harris-Klein debate: We could take Klein as being unable or unwilling to apply rationality (which requires circumscription) at all. Possibly true, but uncharitable. Alternatively…1 reply 1 retweet 5 likesShow this thread -
We could understand Klein as pointing out that Harris is being an “oblivious geek,” i.e. taking a set of circumscription assumptions as a given, and refusing to contemplate alternatives.
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Here is a positive construal of the value of low-decoupled thinking (from
@everytstudies’s post). The opposite of being an oblivious geek is being aware of the richness of the situation.pic.twitter.com/Dmg66Bs5I3
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To summarize my understanding of
@everytstudies’ post in my own jargon: Klein and Harris would have had to have had the meta-rational discussion of what counts as relevant, and why, before getting into the object-level debate. And neither was willing or able to do so.5 replies 4 retweets 22 likesShow this thread -
Replying to @Meaningness @everytstudies
Huh. Did the same thing happen during the Harris Peterson interview? Seemed like maybe Harris was trying to have that discussion and Peterson would never accept the terms? Or maybe something else.
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Replying to @derekvan @everytstudies
I haven’t heard, so I don’t know. I gather they got hung up on different ideas about what “truth” means, and instead of recognizing and discussing that, they both just insisted that their definition was right. In which case, yes, similar failure to address meta-rational issue.
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I would say that Jordan tried to hide his supernaturalism from Sam with a half-baked notion of truth, and Sam fell for his usual failure to listen. We discussed this debate in the comments of: https://andthentheresphysics.wordpress.com/2017/11/04/jordan-peterson-speaks-the-truth/#comment-105661 … I don't believe meta-rationality is a coherent concept, BTW.
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Meta-rationality is figuring out what rational method(s) to apply in a particular situation, and how. Does that seem like an incoherent concept?
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I think rationality already fits that bill. If rationality is meta then meta-rationality is meta-meta-rationality, which looks absurd to me. The very idea of a conceptual scheme is problematic: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3129898 I believe what you're referring to is called meta-cognition.
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Metacognition is definitely a related category! It’s much broader, however. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metacognition …
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It does encompass a variety of propositional attitudes. Now, what would be the propositional attitude meta-rationality is about: "rationalizing"? Searching around, I've found this, via
@johncarlosbaez: http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/deceive.pdf … I'm not convinced by their definition.1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes -
Oh, sorry! To be clear: I have a proprietary definition of “meta-rational,” a term that has few previous uses. My use is *roughly* similar to that of the few precursors, but not identical. This might be a good starting point (though not ideal):https://meaningness.com/metablog/bongard-meta-rationality …
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