but I don't believe that the paradox remains once you fix the problem, so restating it to remove that problem might convince me
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Replying to @admittedlyhuman @Meaningness
the paradox can be explained wrt ravens; if you think something else needs explanation state that something else
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Replying to @admittedlyhuman
A general theory of induction ought to work when we don’t have strong priors.
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Replying to @Meaningness
is that, like, true? there's gotta be a no-free-lunch in there somewhere.
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Replying to @admittedlyhuman
Well a standard Bayesian story is that, yes, your priors don’t matter, because they wash out with sufficient evidence.
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Replying to @Meaningness
I mean if you keep looking at non-black things, and they keep turning out to be non-ravens, eventually won't you start to suspect
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Replying to @admittedlyhuman
No. You wouldn’t. Just empirically: no, no one ever does that.
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Replying to @Meaningness
take it to the extreme: what if you see every non-black thing
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Who cares? We need an account of actual science in the real world. An account of how science would work if you were God is useless (and probably meaningless).
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Replying to @Meaningness
I'm trying to make a philosophical point here, pointing out physical difficulties is sort of missing the point
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Replying to @admittedlyhuman
Philosophical theories that only work in counterfactual worlds are not interesting to me. (This is why I am not a philosopher; nearly all philosophical theories only work in imaginary worlds.)
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