The first step of 'existing knowledge' is necessary — that's where problems come from. And problems are what thinking consists of. It's impossible to think about something without some model. "Model-free" just means your models are less about the form.https://twitter.com/reasonisfun/status/1106853147417423872?s=21 …
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Where #CriticalRationalism and other fallibilist philosophies like#MetaRationalism may differ. (one of the few places they seem to be in actual disagreement?@Meaningness@Malcolm_Ocean)2 replies 0 retweets 0 likesShow this thread -
Replying to @reasonisfun @Meaningness
I don't see a disagreement here! My explicit knowledge of both philosophies is a bit past "I've read Beginning of Infinity and Meaningness". Possible I'm misunderstanding either here. Also possible I'm using them both fluidly in such a way that they don't FEEL they disagree

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Interesting! Think it does part with critical rationalism, e.g. embracing paradox with different models in tension versus the notion each model is solving a different problem (crit rat). The philosophical implications are quite different. Contrast McGilchrist & Deutch excerpts:pic.twitter.com/jwsKncb2Tu
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Replying to @mindmeanings @Malcolm_Ocean and
And McGilchrist elegantly describes the unspoken phenomenological encounter (being). Deutch would agree that we don’t have the words to capture the experience (inexplicit knowledge), but imagines one day we will, through conjecture & refutation leading to objective progress
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Replying to @mindmeanings @Malcolm_Ocean and
Whereas McGilchrist views attempting to quantify our encounters via explicit concepts, detracts from the quality of the experience (over-relying on the left hemisphere).
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Both can happen. The way culture is currently set up, trying to rationalise inexplicit stuff does typically suppress parts of it. Crucially, in Deutsch's view—cf. other rationalists—these two sides are *equal* (should be listened to as equal, full participants). Suppression bad.
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Replying to @reasonisfun @mindmeanings and
But in the Deutschian view, the inexplicit and nebulous can in principle be made explicit and precise. In the McGilchrist view, this can’t be done without loss of meaning. Fallibilism doesn’t get you irreducible nebulosity.
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Replying to @JakeOrthwein @reasonisfun and
(I don’t know about CRs specifically but) this distinction between ontological nebulosity and epistemic uncertainty is the central thing rationalists (other brands at least) don’t understand (and often seem to actively resist understanding for emotional safety reasons)
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Replying to @Meaningness @reasonisfun and
I think the two get confused in CR because it says we could be (and likely are) wrong about any fixed system of rationality. Nebulosity w/r/t any particular construal can then be chalked up to fallibilism. OTOH, this from Popper seems ~consonant with your view.pic.twitter.com/6IzPOPTunx
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Hmm, I don’t understand this passage—maybe I would need to read more of the preceding
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Replying to @Meaningness @reasonisfun and
First pass at an explanation of this:pic.twitter.com/KSKPWqxGwm
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Replying to @JakeOrthwein @reasonisfun and
Thank you for the translation! I think I understand you better than Popper :)
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End of conversation
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