Profound debate, also excellent fun, about the most difficult, important question in the philosophy of mind. My two favorite cognitive scientists, Brian Cantwell Smith and @vervaeke_john, arguing opposite sides
h/t @JakeOrthweinhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lpu7766Rlks&feature=youtu.be …
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John argues fundamental cognitive processes simply can’t ground in representation; one reason is the combinatorial explosion of potentially relevant factors. An alternative embodied/interactive account resolves this error. I’ve taken this line since 1986: https://meaningness.com/metablog/abstract-emergent#footnote2_h91xjou …pic.twitter.com/rPRsyeOZKU
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John also invokes the phenomenon of “pure consciousness” in meditation, in which you are (intensely) conscious, but not conscious *of* anything. Representations are generally taken to be necessarily *of* something, so it would seem this is consciousness without representation.
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Brian’s central point is that we can think about (and be conscious of?) concerns we’re not currently causally connected to; so an interactivist, causal theory cannot be fully adequate. Which is importantly true! So how do we do that? Representation, says Brian…
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But, we know the representationalist story can’t work, for a host of reasons, each individually fatal—as Brian acknowledges. Some other account of representation is required; he’s devoted decades to working one out. I’m not sure I understand it; I tend to doubt it works, but…
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Brian’s theory of representation is sufficiently radical that it requires fundamental rethinking of the nature of computation; and here I think he’s right. Semi-relevantly, from my 1986 paper with Phil Agre: https://meaningness.com/metablog/abstract-emergent …pic.twitter.com/uKq4Nt5l4o
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Around the middle of the video, John and Brian find that they are in violent agreement on many substantive points, where both strongly disagree with traditional cognitivism. Here I am in strong agreement with both of them (and reiterate my customary disdain for mainstream cogsci)
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They end by agreeing that much of the difficulty is in the nebulosity of both “consciousness” and “representation.” It’s tempting to dismiss the issues as hopelessly vague. But important; so their hashing out conflicting understandings is valuable (and fascinating!).
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