Profound debate, also excellent fun, about the most difficult, important question in the philosophy of mind. My two favorite cognitive scientists, Brian Cantwell Smith and @vervaeke_john, arguing opposite sides
h/t @JakeOrthweinhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lpu7766Rlks&feature=youtu.be …
-
-
But, we know the representationalist story can’t work, for a host of reasons, each individually fatal—as Brian acknowledges. Some other account of representation is required; he’s devoted decades to working one out. I’m not sure I understand it; I tend to doubt it works, but…
Show this thread -
Brian’s theory of representation is sufficiently radical that it requires fundamental rethinking of the nature of computation; and here I think he’s right. Semi-relevantly, from my 1986 paper with Phil Agre: https://meaningness.com/metablog/abstract-emergent …pic.twitter.com/uKq4Nt5l4o
Show this thread -
Around the middle of the video, John and Brian find that they are in violent agreement on many substantive points, where both strongly disagree with traditional cognitivism. Here I am in strong agreement with both of them (and reiterate my customary disdain for mainstream cogsci)
Show this thread -
They end by agreeing that much of the difficulty is in the nebulosity of both “consciousness” and “representation.” It’s tempting to dismiss the issues as hopelessly vague. But important; so their hashing out conflicting understandings is valuable (and fascinating!).
Show this thread
End of conversation
New conversation -
-
-
If there is a representation from prior exposure, sure, but not of something outside of representation (which brushes against free will).
Thanks. Twitter will use this to make your timeline better. UndoUndo
-
Loading seems to be taking a while.
Twitter may be over capacity or experiencing a momentary hiccup. Try again or visit Twitter Status for more information.