If I just say that my philosophical treatise isn’t philosophy, it won’t be. Pretty much.
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Replying to @RealtimeAI
I hope that when you read it, you will agree that it’s not philosophical!
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Replying to @Meaningness
I have read much and already found much that I consider philosophy. Maybe we just use that word differently. But I don’t know what else you could call a (rational / reasoned / argument-based / logical ?) discussion about different ways of approaching thinking itself.
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Replying to @RealtimeAI @Meaningness
I do find you mostly to be attacking straw men. But, Deutsch helped me jettison a lot of this semantics stuff. We’re trying to make sense with each other. If someone calling themselves a “rationalist” wants to defend a logical contradiction, they’re just being *irrational*.
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Replying to @RealtimeAI @Meaningness
In Deutschian terms, Chapman is largely criticizing foundationalist/justificationist accounts of rationality. Doesn't generally help to read him as a critique of CR. I think if there's a critique of CR there, it's that it doesn't attend to how people actually reason in practice
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Replying to @JakeOrthwein @RealtimeAI
David Chapman Retweeted David Chapman
Oh, that’s a nice way of explaining it, which clarifies the matter for me! However, see this thread where I complain that CR isn’t specific enough to be helpful:https://twitter.com/Meaningness/status/1222610654139256832 …
David Chapman added,
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Replying to @Meaningness @RealtimeAI
This is very helpful! Is it from a forthcoming Eggplant chapter? This bit from Kegan does seem very Popperian, but I guess CR would have to explain how the conjecture and criticism processes are getting micro-implemented in everyday practical action.pic.twitter.com/v4Xvu8NqoY
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Replying to @JakeOrthwein @Meaningness
I think this is where Deutsch comes in. RE: thermometers, we have “good explanations” about why we each aspect of the situation should be as it is. And we could trace back different levels of explanation to different questions about how we “know”.
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Replying to @RealtimeAI @Meaningness
But hard-to-varyness (the property of that makes explanations good) is only ever determined relative to a given parochial problem. Deutsch admits this, and that "theories" can be non-propositional, so the question is: how are we reliably implementing this?
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Replying to @JakeOrthwein @Meaningness
The “this” you’re hypothesizing is a mechanical way of turning energy into new knowledge. That’s what fallibilism denies. There is no “reliable” way. You have to guess. If you have a good enough guess, you can try checking it. If it keeps working, thats your new theory.
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Some guidance on how to get a good-enough guess, and on how to test whether it works well-enough, would be helpful! I agree strongly that there’s no general recipe, but there are lots of heuristics at varying levels of generality.
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