Yes, iirc that was Michael’s descrption of Minsky’s concept (which I think is accurate, though I’m not an expert), which Culadasa has adapted. 1/2
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The “intentional stance” version (which is not fully eliminativist) seems importantly correct in a sense, but winds up not explaining anything. “There aren’t really any beliefs, but it’s helpful to pretend there are.” OK, I can agree, but why does that work?
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Maybe the ethnomethodological story would be “we all pretend to have beliefs because it’s a useful API for collaboration”
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I am a big fan of the move that tries to transcend questions like "is x real?" by blowing up tidy notions of "real". That is, anything we can talk about is real in some sense and the question is, in what sense?
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Yes, I agree strongly, and that’s why I did ask if the paper is specifically worth reading, because it seemed like Dennett was waving in that direction
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