3) re: subminds, there were some mentions of Minsky/Culadasa assuming some "master submind" which is in control. Was a little confused by that, since a prominent theme for both is that there is no such special submind or homunculus, and that it's all decision-making by committee.
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Replying to @xuenay @OortCloudAtlas
Yes, iirc that was Michael’s descrption of Minsky’s concept (which I think is accurate, though I’m not an expert), which Culadasa has adapted. 1/2
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Problem is that the homunculus is still there logically - if subminds are taken as accurate representation of how the brain works. One can simply declare that it isn’t, and proceed with theory based on fiat. That might be fruitful, and seems to be so for many.
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Yes this is another version of the “billions of tiny spooks” problem. As usual no one has done a good explanation of this for a general audience, although it’s well-understood in philosophy of mind. Why do I always have to do all the translational work?https://meaningness.com/representational-theory-of-mind …
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Curious about why you people think the homonculus is still there.
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(Awake briefly at 2:30am, will follow up later) (Speaking only for myself): It’s not there; it’s that cognitivist explanations of subjectivity, and of intentionality, can’t work without it.
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Replying to @Meaningness @xuenay and
So, the question is, how do you get mental things in a materialist metaphysics, i.e. one without spooks (such as a homunculus). Dennett is unusual in seemingly taking an “eliminationist” approach, i.e. simply denying that the mental phenomena (qualia, intentionality) exist.
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Replying to @Meaningness @xuenay and
(“Seemingly” because when I last read his stuff, which was like 30 years ago, he waffled a bit. He may have clarified or changed his position since, but I haven’t heard so.)
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Replying to @Meaningness @xuenay and
Been awhile since I read Dennett but I don't think he's really an eliminationist. He has a "useful fictions" approach to mental realism that I find pretty tolerable: https://ruccs.rutgers.edu/images/personal-zenon-pylyshyn/class-info/FP2012/FP2012_readings/Dennett_RealPatterns.pdf …
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Mmm, well, maybe what I called “waffle” is better described as “motte and bailey.” Is this paper worth reading for specific insight? Or mostly an example of his retreating to the reasonable bailey temporarily when attacked?
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[bother, I got the motte and the bailey mixed up. you retreat to the motte, not to the bailey.]
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