Yes, iirc that was Michael’s descrption of Minsky’s concept (which I think is accurate, though I’m not an expert), which Culadasa has adapted. 1/2
So say we admit there is subjective experience and want to explain it. Generally experience is experience *of* something; it is “intentional” in the technical sense of *about* something. So how does it get its aboutness?
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The usual cognitivist move is to make the intentionality of experience dependent on the intentionality of representations. That’s because for a while they thought they had an explanation for the intentionality of representations.
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Or, actually, they thought AI guys did. We thought they did, so we both proceeded with the assumption that intentionality was understood, leaving the hard part to the other field. Once both sides realized this, the whole thing imploded.
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