3) re: subminds, there were some mentions of Minsky/Culadasa assuming some "master submind" which is in control. Was a little confused by that, since a prominent theme for both is that there is no such special submind or homunculus, and that it's all decision-making by committee.
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So say we admit there is subjective experience and want to explain it. Generally experience is experience *of* something; it is “intentional” in the technical sense of *about* something. So how does it get its aboutness?
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The usual cognitivist move is to make the intentionality of experience dependent on the intentionality of representations. That’s because for a while they thought they had an explanation for the intentionality of representations.
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you mean the universe is not even a simulation?
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