Great interview! Scattered thoughts:
1) @_awbery_ 's speech is really pleasant to listen to :) there's a slight drawing-out of words, that gives their speech a thoughtful and controlled vibe
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2) was a little surprised by how positively and extensively
@_awbery_ talks about TMI, given that their blog posts and other comments have sounded a little critical2 replies 0 retweets 2 likes -
3) re: subminds, there were some mentions of Minsky/Culadasa assuming some "master submind" which is in control. Was a little confused by that, since a prominent theme for both is that there is no such special submind or homunculus, and that it's all decision-making by committee.
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Replying to @xuenay @OortCloudAtlas
Yes, iirc that was Michael’s descrption of Minsky’s concept (which I think is accurate, though I’m not an expert), which Culadasa has adapted. 1/2
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Problem is that the homunculus is still there logically - if subminds are taken as accurate representation of how the brain works. One can simply declare that it isn’t, and proceed with theory based on fiat. That might be fruitful, and seems to be so for many.
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Yes this is another version of the “billions of tiny spooks” problem. As usual no one has done a good explanation of this for a general audience, although it’s well-understood in philosophy of mind. Why do I always have to do all the translational work?https://meaningness.com/representational-theory-of-mind …
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Curious about why you people think the homonculus is still there.
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(Awake briefly at 2:30am, will follow up later) (Speaking only for myself): It’s not there; it’s that cognitivist explanations of subjectivity, and of intentionality, can’t work without it.
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Replying to @Meaningness @xuenay and
So, the question is, how do you get mental things in a materialist metaphysics, i.e. one without spooks (such as a homunculus). Dennett is unusual in seemingly taking an “eliminationist” approach, i.e. simply denying that the mental phenomena (qualia, intentionality) exist.
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Replying to @Meaningness @xuenay and
(“Seemingly” because when I last read his stuff, which was like 30 years ago, he waffled a bit. He may have clarified or changed his position since, but I haven’t heard so.)
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Eliminativism solves the logical problem, but hardly anyone else buys it. Also it seems to make the substantive part of the job of cogsci much harder, because you can no longer use mental entities in your explanations.
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Replying to @Meaningness @xuenay and
Also, Eliminativist: You don’t have subjective experiences. Anyone else: Yes I do! E: That’s just an illusion. A: An illusion is a mistaken subjective experience, and you just said I don’t have them.
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Replying to @Meaningness @xuenay and
E: Well, I was being polite. Actually, you are just wired up to say you have experiences. And beliefs. You don’t actually believe you have experiences, or anything else. No one is home; you are a low-quality robot. A: [Punches him]
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