Are there any accounts of "emptiness", preferably purely phenomenological/methodological, that don't presume a contentious metaphysics?
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Replying to @FateOfTwist_
“The absence of thought with the presence of awareness” seems relatively unproblematic. (Although the possibility if rhat is denied by some major philosophers.) Nb I don’t particularly advocate that definition, just noting it as reasonably inoffensive metaphysically
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Replying to @Meaningness
What do you not like about it, that it is in some sense misleading (like given differing interpretations of what "thought" is), or that it is outright false/there is more to it?
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Replying to @FateOfTwist_ @Meaningness
The best technical translation of the description I have read is “a non-affirming negative phenomena” Berzin describes it as things cannot exist in impossible ways which I don’t think is as good as the first def. a negation which does not affirm some other thing.
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Replying to @SlaytonBenjamin @FateOfTwist_
That’s a particular interpretation of emptiness, from Prasangika Madhyamaka. FWIW I think that interpretation has some unfortunate consequences, but I agree that it is metaphysically relatively unproblematic.
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Replying to @Meaningness @FateOfTwist_
What do you think are the consequences? To me it seems that is the most exact technical definition, the other schools seem to present the interpretation that bc it’s non conceptual/direct experience it can’t have a technical def. although it’s endlessly talked about/described.
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Replying to @SlaytonBenjamin @FateOfTwist_
Hmm. It seems you think there is a single, specific thing that this word points at? I don’t there is. Explaining what’s wrong with Prasangika would take quite a few tweets (or a long book; Mipham’s _Beacon of Certainty_ is one standard source).
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Replying to @Meaningness @FateOfTwist_
It seems to be what all the schools converge/divide on. If there is something true to be discovered all the descriptions must point at the “specific thing” but the thing is an absence of a thing. If that makes any sense.
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That analysis presupposes the Prasangika conclusion: that “emptiness” is a mere negation. That is explicitly rejected by other schools (e.g. Nyingma and zhentong), which ascribe positive characteristics to it.
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Replying to @Meaningness @FateOfTwist_
I get that the presentation is different, as far as I understand it the Prasangika definition is the only concise technical definition. The Nyigma presentation seems more to me of the “cant have a definition/impossible to describe or explain, metaphysical explanation.
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I have the impression they disagree about their descriptions but are in fact describing the same thing.
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