Well the question would be where you draw the line, or if you think intentionality is continuously graded. If you grant it to the thermostat, what mechanisms are *not* intentional, and why not?
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Replying to @Meaningness @OortCloudAtlas and
According to Dennett, which I follow, a thing is has intention if it is useful to regard it as having intention. This pragmatic in the philosophical sense.
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Replying to @robamacl @OortCloudAtlas and
Yeees… that view is popular outside the field, but was not widely accepted within it. Problem is it doesn’t help explain anything about “how do minds/brains work” which is what cogsci wanted, nor does it give any purchase on the philosophical questions.
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Replying to @Meaningness @OortCloudAtlas and
IMO, "not answering hard philosophical questions" is an expected property of useful theories. When it comes to philosophically loaded terms like intention, they probably should end up being ontogically remodeled in same way as "planet".
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Replying to @robamacl @OortCloudAtlas and
Yes, exactly. The point is not “representations don’t exist” but that the category is highly problematic; trying to build a rigorous theory on it reliably fails, so in any specific case you want a different ontology, or at least get clear about what “representation” means in situ
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Replying to @Meaningness @OortCloudAtlas and
FWIW, "useful to regard it as having intention" is not circular; this is a highly knowledge-based situated judgement which people often get wrong in practice. This question of "what model do I use" has a meta-rational flavor.
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Replying to @robamacl @OortCloudAtlas and
Yes, I think that’s importantly right. OTOH, the binary judgement is/not intentional is rarely sufficient; you need to go on to specifics. And then the hard issues come back (and they probably generally feed into binary judgement, too!) However >
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Replying to @Meaningness @robamacl and
Much of the difficulty was due to trying to make a general/rational/context-free/purpose-independent theory of intentionality, whereas in often specific cases are quite clear. That’s the ethnomethodological aqua regia: respecify theoretical problems as practical hassles.
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Replying to @Meaningness @OortCloudAtlas and
the ethnomethodological aqua regia: respecify theoretical problems as practical hassles.1 reply 0 retweets 1 like -
Replying to @robamacl @OortCloudAtlas and
“Harold Garfinkel’s One Weird Trick”
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David Chapman Retweeted
This very brief video clip (start 10:55) nails the issues of contextuality, truth, and respecification (h/t @context_ing).
Bonus! at 13:15 a brief discussion of Peter Galison’s _Objectivity_ (coauthor Lorraine Daston); I invoked him downthread.
https://twitter.com/context_ing/status/1143732431159087104 …
David Chapman added,
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