I'd say that at least one thing I mean by representation is that it causally mediates mediates behavior. If I change the state of the representation, then the behavior will change.
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Replying to @robamacl @Meaningness and
So, we might say the position of the bimetal strip in a (old) thermostat resents the temperature. If I push on the strip, I can change that and make the furnace go on.
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Replying to @robamacl @Meaningness and
Likewise, if someone stole a stone from the shepard's basket, his behavior would change. But no such effect from the stones the passing girl has.
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Replying to @robamacl @OortCloudAtlas and
Well, this was the main topic of philosophy of mind in the 80s, and I think it’s reasonably fair to say that it ended with everyone giving up and moving on. Dennet was one major player. The problems are hairy and not easily summarized.
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Replying to @Meaningness @robamacl and
The buzzword was “intentionality” in analytic philosophy and “the symbol-grounding problem” in AI. The “binding problem” was a related manifestation in connectionism. I’d suggest the SEP articles cited here? [Eggplant draft text]pic.twitter.com/qQoBMCroDV
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Replying to @Meaningness @robamacl and
“Intentionality” is just jargon for “aboutness.” The question is how can a physical thing-in-the-head be about something else. The usual analysis is that the bimetallic strip is *not* intentional because it’s too closely coupled causally. (Not everyone agrees on this point.)
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Replying to @Meaningness @OortCloudAtlas and
FWIW, Dennett does (or at least did) consider thermostats to have intention, and I am willing to go there. But I don't want to drag you into this morass unless you are interested in going there.
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Replying to @robamacl @OortCloudAtlas and
Well the question would be where you draw the line, or if you think intentionality is continuously graded. If you grant it to the thermostat, what mechanisms are *not* intentional, and why not?
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Replying to @Meaningness @OortCloudAtlas and
According to Dennett, which I follow, a thing is has intention if it is useful to regard it as having intention. This pragmatic in the philosophical sense.
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Replying to @robamacl @OortCloudAtlas and
Yeees… that view is popular outside the field, but was not widely accepted within it. Problem is it doesn’t help explain anything about “how do minds/brains work” which is what cogsci wanted, nor does it give any purchase on the philosophical questions.
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It’s like “beauty is in the mind of the beholder” as a theory of aesthetics. I mean, yes, that’s probably true in some sense, but it’s just a refusal to even consider any of the hard problems.
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