This failure is unsurprising in hindsight. One clue is that this clearly is not how relatively simple organisms such as flatworms generate behavior.
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IMO, "not answering hard philosophical questions" is an expected property of useful theories. When it comes to philosophically loaded terms like intention, they probably should end up being ontogically remodeled in same way as "planet".
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Yes, exactly. The point is not “representations don’t exist” but that the category is highly problematic; trying to build a rigorous theory on it reliably fails, so in any specific case you want a different ontology, or at least get clear about what “representation” means in situ
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It’s like “beauty is in the mind of the beholder” as a theory of aesthetics. I mean, yes, that’s probably true in some sense, but it’s just a refusal to even consider any of the hard problems.
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