I also understand that what we might call strong representationism form AI circa '80 did not pan out. This is is idea that we can "represent the world" in logic or whatever, then we can represent what we want to happen, and run SAT solver or whatever and get useful behavior.
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Replying to @robamacl @Meaningness and
This failure is unsurprising in hindsight. One clue is that this clearly is not how relatively simple organisms such as flatworms generate behavior.
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Replying to @robamacl @Meaningness and
I'd say that at least one thing I mean by representation is that it causally mediates mediates behavior. If I change the state of the representation, then the behavior will change.
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Replying to @robamacl @Meaningness and
So, we might say the position of the bimetal strip in a (old) thermostat resents the temperature. If I push on the strip, I can change that and make the furnace go on.
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Replying to @robamacl @Meaningness and
Likewise, if someone stole a stone from the shepard's basket, his behavior would change. But no such effect from the stones the passing girl has.
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Replying to @robamacl @OortCloudAtlas and
Well, this was the main topic of philosophy of mind in the 80s, and I think it’s reasonably fair to say that it ended with everyone giving up and moving on. Dennet was one major player. The problems are hairy and not easily summarized.
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Replying to @Meaningness @robamacl and
The buzzword was “intentionality” in analytic philosophy and “the symbol-grounding problem” in AI. The “binding problem” was a related manifestation in connectionism. I’d suggest the SEP articles cited here? [Eggplant draft text]pic.twitter.com/qQoBMCroDV
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Replying to @Meaningness @robamacl and
“Intentionality” is just jargon for “aboutness.” The question is how can a physical thing-in-the-head be about something else. The usual analysis is that the bimetallic strip is *not* intentional because it’s too closely coupled causally. (Not everyone agrees on this point.)
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Replying to @Meaningness @OortCloudAtlas and
FWIW, Dennett does (or at least did) consider thermostats to have intention, and I am willing to go there. But I don't want to drag you into this morass unless you are interested in going there.
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Replying to @robamacl @OortCloudAtlas and
Well the question would be where you draw the line, or if you think intentionality is continuously graded. If you grant it to the thermostat, what mechanisms are *not* intentional, and why not?
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Yeah, I think this is better not done on twitter! The Varela, Thompson, Rosch book is probably as good as any (although I haven’t read it since it was first published, so I can’t remember exactly their positions in the debates). The SEP articles are probably understandable.
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