This sounds more like pragmatist account w/ implicit Wittgenstein criticism, though I'm lacking the context (interested in the rest). Right now, I feel like "usually" is doing a lot of work here. When does correspondence theory *not* work in your view (or require metaphysics)?
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Yes… some similarities with both PI Wittgenstein and pragmatism. But actually more like ethnomethodology. Correspondence theories are usually explicitly metaphysical nowadays. Cognitivist attempts to naturalize them conclusively failed around 1990. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/#nature …
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I assume Kripke Naming and Necessity is in your .bib?
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I haven’t actually read it, but I’m familiar with the argument from secondary sources (and doing modal model theory in logic classes).
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This explanation still sounds solipsistic to me. Truth is more social than this.
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Can amend to “something we do together.” I’m drawing heavily on ethnomethodology for this, which I as social as anything gets!
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Correspondence theory is utterly useless. ""snow is white" is true iff snow is white" - determining when snow is white is intuitive but reflectively opaque ""apples are made of quarks" is true iff apples are made of quarks" - how do you check if apples are made of quarks?
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Not yet, I’m afraid! Glad you like them though
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