Non-equilibrium game theory.
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Replying to @FrameOfStack
Without equilibria, how do you decide what kind of agents to talk about? Random agents?
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Replying to @ObjectOfObjects
I think you want some kind of rational agent constraint, still; recursive "common knowledge of rationality", even. Just refuse to accept arbitrary equilibria.
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Replying to @FrameOfStack @ObjectOfObjects
I think this is all covered with models of satisficing agents. The solutions aren't unique, they are often order dependent, and simulations to look at outcomes based on partial computation by agents are computationally annoying.
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Replying to @MakerOfDecision @FrameOfStack
I think satisficing agents are not a real thing, although e.g. sigmoidal cost functions are.
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Replying to @ObjectOfObjects @FrameOfStack
MakerOfDecision Retweeted #TestAndTrace Smith 🐇
AFAICT, satisficing is the only workable applied model of decision making under computational constraints.https://twitter.com/Noahpinion/status/733543776258424832 …
MakerOfDecision added,
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And for @FrameOfStack, here's a paper laying this out for decision theory; https://arxiv.org/abs/1308.3780
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