Kissinger Institute

Fan: "China is reactive to what the US is doing and what it has done." Notes nervousness from China in aftermath of 2016 elections, but that China's assessments of benefits of assertiveness vs what it stands to lose. Its opportunism is balanced by its pragmatism"

Kuo:"Xi has deeply alienated a lot of intelligentsia. Does that mean they are on the brink? They mostly belong to the loyal opposition that has roots in pre-Communist China," describes balance of pen and sword as driver of politics in China. Since 1989, not sure if tinder is dry

On #nCoV2019, Fan notices Chinese govt is "infantilizing" of its people, but finds that the drawing of distinction between "virtuous people and evil government," that "people are completely clueless" Is also infantilizing

Kuo on American perspectives: "We seemed to have seized on the idea that history is heading in a particular direction," but historical circumstance and specific turns and changes are not understood

Daly: "If you look back at the last 40 years, do you see any lessons that would make sense for us to consider as we develop a response to a risen China? Or is this year zero, where engagement offers no lessons?"

Fan: Goals of engagement were "modest," and were for China to open up markets and adhere to international norms, not to develop Jeffersonian-style democracy.

Kuo: "We don't talk about engaging with Merkel's Germany, Macron's France, or Trudeau's Canada. We save that term to describe countries with which we have value chasms with," believes pre-2008 engagement moved Chinese attitudes towards wanting less autocratic politics

Kuo wonders what caused illiberal turn from 2008/2009: "If you look at 2001-2008, you can't find much that roiled the waters between China and the United States" China, when it perceived to not be under threat, "was liberalizing"