G. E. Moore’s discussion of “naturalistic fallacy” in fact targets not moral naturalism, but moral reductionism (no matter naturalistic or non-naturalistic). “Naturalistic fallacy” is not a fallacy, it’s an objection to moral reductionism. Reference: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/#NatFal …
More timely now than when it was first published. We are on the cusp the resolution of group difference questions with modern genomics, and society must be ready for the findings. https://www.nature.com/articles/272390a0 …pic.twitter.com/5mXGRBmYs2
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I'm aware of the history of the term, but that's not how it is used now a days. You might similarly quibble with use of Hume's is-ought distinction, when Hume himself derived ought from is (ideal observer theorist).
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