Kevin Simler

The title suggests a cheeky approach, as if it were written for an aspiring dictator. This is misleading. The book is actually a work of straightforward political science (both theoretical and empirical). Maybe not as fun, but still very enlightening.

Here's the main thesis: Leaders everywhere — dictators, prime ministers, CEOs, HOA presidents — face the same incentives. To stay in power, they need to keep their key supporters happy. (Typically .) Otherwise the leader will be swapped out for someone more effective.

That's pretty much it. The trick is not to treat dictators as all-powerful or to assume benevolence on the part of democratic leaders. Everyone's part of a coalition and everyone acts in their self-interest.

The crucial variable is the SIZE of the ruling coalition, i.e., the # of key supporters needed for the leader to remain in power. When the coalition is small, you get dictatorships, poverty, and oppression. When the coalition is big, you get democracies, prosperity, and freedom.

From these simple premises, the book then sheds light on a wide variety of political phenomena: dynasties, coups, revolutions, purges, foreign aid, debt relief, taxes, elections, freedom, and of course war.

All in all, I highly recommended The Dictator's Handbook. It does what too many works of social science utterly fail to do, i.e., TAKE INCENTIVES SERIOUSLY. It also pairs nicely with The Elephant in the Brain (esp. the chapter on politics). Now some quotes and takeaways...

"The three most important characteristics of a coalition are: (1) Loyalty; (2) Loyalty; (3) Loyalty." — The Dictator's Handbook

"From the perspective of this book, so-called liberals and so-called conservatives appear simply to have carved out separate electoral niches that give them a good chance of winning office." — The Dictator's Handbook

"History is full of democratic Davids beating autocratic Goliaths." — The Dictator's Handbook

"A man always has two reasons for doing anything: a good reason and the real reason." — J. P. Morgan

The book also has a VERY cynical take on foreign aid (esp. disaster relief) intended to help citizens of autocratic governments: (1) Autocrats take most of the $ for themselves; (2) Knowing aid $ will come creates a perverse incentive not to prevent disasters ahead of time.

Savvy governments (e.g., the US State Department) understand that aid money mostly goes to the dictator and his coalition, which is why they use it for bribes (i.e., to extract policy concessions), all in the guise of "helping the poor."

But finally (on an optimistic note), the book portrays democracies as relatively stable arrangements(!), stuck in a kind of virtuous cycle where both citizens AND leaders benefit from key political freedoms.

Why key political freedoms (speech, press, assembly) are mostly stable in a democracy: 1. Politicians who provide freedoms make voters happy ⇒ re-elected. 2. Politicians need free speech to know what voters actually want. 3. Free people work harder and smarter ⇒ ↑ tax revenue.