Josh Zumbrun

.@greg_ip (3) that even if adverse shocks did drive the Fed to the ZLB sometime, such excursions to the ZLB would be rare and short.

.@greg_ip (4) Confidence in the durability of the “Great Moderation”, and the consequent belief that we did not need to worry about what

.@greg_ip (5) might happen in what @ojblanchard1 calls “dark corners” was, in retrospect—and some of us thought in prospect—very wrong. It

.@greg_ip (6) was, I think, a major element in what led the economics department to put itself in a position where it got itself schlonged

.@greg_ip (7) by reality since 2005 or so…

@delong @greg_ip I've always struggled understanding how carefully thought out 2% actually was.

@JHWeissmann @delong @greg_ip have you read the work of Akerlof/Perry et al in the 1990s on this?

@JHWeissmann @delong @greg_ip there was some pretty thoughtful work here; clear now they might not have appreciated risk of hitting ZLB