I don't know what that means but I am bored now so I will leave it here.
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Replying to @HPluckrose
My initial point was that Dawkins defines truth narrowly as verifiable information, and that it is only by keeping that narrow definition that you can oppose truth and meaningfulness. Truth, though, does not just refer to scientific verifiability. But OK: I'll stop boring you.
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Replying to @ComplaintStick
Well, yes. You can assert that 'truth does not just refer to scientific verifiability' and other people, like Dawkins and like me, will say that is the whole problem. Calling things which have not been established by evidence 'truth.' That is what we are criticising,
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Replying to @HPluckrose @ComplaintStick
If you say you use the word 'truth' to describe things which have been established to be true by evidence and to describe things which have not been established to be true by evidence, I can only ask you to consider not doing so, particularly with post-truth problem going on.
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Replying to @HPluckrose @ComplaintStick
Your point that Dawkins calls things true when this has been established by evidence did not really need to be made because that is not at all ambiguous. The difference is that I think he is right to do so and you think he is wrong.
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Replying to @HPluckrose
He's not wrong. I believe in science. The discussing you and I are having isn't scientific but philosophical, yet it's still a question of evidence, but not scientific evidence. And we are concerned with agreeing or disagreeing not about what is meaningful but about what is true.
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Replying to @ComplaintStick
I really can't put my position across any more clearly than I have. You can either address it clearly as it is or not. You have chosen not and I have things to do.
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Replying to @HPluckrose
It's true that science is based on evidence. But there are other kinds of evidence than just scientific. Philosophical argument, for example, is based on other kinds of evidence. Philosophical arguments still concern questions of truth and evidence, but in fields outside science.
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Replying to @ComplaintStick @HPluckrose
If one says that scientific evidence is the only kind of evidence, then philosophy is just a part of science. But if we say that philosophy works with forms of evidence not limited to scientific evidence, then the use of evidence is not itself sufficient to distinguish science.
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Replying to @ComplaintStick
Give me an example of a form of evidence not limited to scientific evidence? Are we talking about evidence of things not generally studied by the natural sciences - eg medieval manuscripts being evidence of beliefs held in that period?
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Or are we into "faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen" and "I feel it in my heart."
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