What's interesting with both of these transitions is that in some sense the stronger emotion is just the weaker emotion but more so. Rage is just more anger, loathing is just more hatred. But it crosses a threshold where the response changes and this in turn changes the feeling.
The book is making two arguments in this space: 1. The specific labelling of emotional states has a strong impact on the experience of those states. 2. The word "emotion" applies specifically to out labels of those states. I think (1) is definitely true and (2) is nonsense.
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Because that requires us to take emotion statements about non-linguistic entities as category errors. "The dog is afraid" is obviously a perfectly sensible statement, but Barrett's use of the word emotion does not consider that as valid because the dog cannot label that state.
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Hmm. Emotions as reflecting a person's disposition is a concept I can go along with, but a felt sense of predisposition is something that I don't relate to at all, and give the side-eye to. Emotions seem to me to be mostly situational. A lot of my tastes are acquired.
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