Gary Marcus

Yes of course. I'm more concerned with the subtle switch of argument, though. What starts as a request for a model description (*any* model description, at this point) quickly becomes a debate about whether others are focusing on the right problem

i just posted two detailed tweets about specific desiderata for models; the field might benefit if you would engage in their substance and plausibility rather than meta issues.

Actually proposing a solution to a problem is a meta issue?

no, but parsing switches in arguments and trying to undermine my credentials are meta tactics that don’t engage in my specific proposal. folks like you feign interest and then don’t engage when i give you a list of concrete claims. it’s not ultimately a good look.

But there is no specific proposal for a model that has those desiderata! <--This is precisely the point. What you perceive as lack of engagement is me trying to get us to stop talking past each other and actually talk about a solution. Desired properties != solution

I don't think the onus is on Gary to propose the solution. I think the onus is on Gary to specify (if he hasn't done so already) the experiment which, if executed according to a well-defined protocol, shows whether or not a candidate model satisfies those desiderata.

how about if we start with a mechanism that can induce (relatively) arbitrary universally quantified one to one mappings per the long and detailed argument in chapter 3 of the algebraic mind? solving that will represent real progress, and then we can turn to chapter 4

Let's assume that some have not read your book. Would it be possible to formulate a more concise set of problems, formulated in a way that would make proposed solutions falsifiable? Something like a Turing test (flawed as it is) was quite clearly stated, clear to non-experts.