Are there any accounts of "emptiness", preferably purely phenomenological/methodological, that don't presume a contentious metaphysics?
These are all actually exactly the sort of contentious metaphysical positions I have issue with.
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If all we experience is map, stuff served up by the brain (how do you know anything about that organ in your skull just from meditation, and not from metaphysical interpretations of science?), then reference to reality is not possible.
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"that is a cup" becomes always false, and must be replaced with "I experience that as a cup" or "that looks like a cup" or similar in all cases.
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