We all knew any CS rep could do an account take down. We trust them to do this. The question becomes why are we now bothered by it?
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Replying to @EricaJoy @lizthegrey
Why are folks suddenly concerned that the normal process of a CS rep involves access and authority to do account take downs?
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Replying to @EricaJoy
Because of going out of way to do it to one specific user. And breakdown of "of course you'll be caught, therefore don't do it" deterrent.
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Replying to @lizthegrey @EricaJoy
I understand why many are happy this happened the way it did. I'm worried it corrupts into other rogue actions, and not just against Trump.
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Replying to @lizthegrey @EricaJoy
But Trump isn't every other user, he is fundamentally different, and in any case these abilities *always* existed, evidently. That's key.
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The argument re: slippery slope doesn't really hold, because we have apparently always been on this slope, and it's never been slippery.
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Replying to @EmilyGorcenski @EricaJoy
A lot of layers in user data protection systems at various cos are built on auditing access afterwards. This isn't a giant surprise to me.
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They're usually effective as part of a defense in depth strategy because they make risk far larger than reward.
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I'm worried that either of two things happens: (1) Twitter makes example of this person, or (2) the risk/reward equation changes for future
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Both of them are not great; (1) means sending someone to jail, (2) will embolden white supremacists to further go rogue at techcos.
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I doubt anyone will see jail. Civil action maybe. But the rapid restoration speaks against any real harm done.
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