So wait, NDSS accepted and published an entire new VPN protocol with no security analysis?
I'm sure @CasCremers wouldn't be happy to hear hear symbolic proofs are "not sufficient". But in either case, I agree that having computational proofs is a nice additional verification. Which is why this new paper is useful and important --
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-- it provides the first computational confirmations, as well as pointing to the need to improve the computational proof toolkit to handle new Noise-based protocols. Hopefully it will be motivation for people to further develop ACCE model into something nicer and more complete.
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I’d be happy to hash that out with
@CasCremers. Would be a good panel topic! I think symbolic proofs aren’t sufficient. But to actually back this up I’m curious if there are any examples (even contrived ones) where a broken protocol survives one analysis but not the other. - 1 more reply
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