Can you recommend an overview of everything wrong with probabilistic epistemology? I haven’t found one. There’s lots of papers that say “this particular objection is fatal, so why don’t you guys stop pretending,” but maybe no compendium of those?
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Okay… we agree that it is possible to fail to apply rational methods when they would be useful, and some people may make that mistake often.
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That's still Toolbox thinking! There are perspectives on life besides whether some recipe would be useful at a given moment!
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Yes, you are right. Let me amend the previous tweet to “framework” from “method.” This may be revealing, as you are arguing. 1/2
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I do understand the object-level distinction between mathematical frameworks and specific methods. However, at the meta-rational level, frameworks are themselves just methods, because they are not universally applicable. 2/3
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So the object-level distinction between frameworks and methods is not as salient for me as it is for you. 3/3
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One factor distinguishing the Lawful metatool is the expectation of hidden, nonobvious simplicity and generality. If Jaynes had possessed *more* faith in probability, he might have been more likely to extend it to non-omnisicient distributions on quantified sentences.
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Well, that’s very interesting, and makes sense! I definitely do not have an expectation of hidden simplicity. Perhaps that fundamental prior is what distinguishes our worldviews.
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My own big contribution to decision theory was logical decision theory, which replaced a huge number of complicated patches to the "fatal" objection of Newcomb's Problem with a simple, unified view. Because I knew it couldn't possibly *actually* be the case that the...
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