Our point in this paper is that if a user can upload many datasets, there are ways to learn genotypes that are supposed to be private. Depending on how the DTC service is configured, the majority of genotypes in the database can be revealed with a few hundred uploads. (6/n)
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Luckily, all the attacks we describe are preventable, or at least can be made inefficient, if DTC services use a subset of the countermeasures we describe (17/n)pic.twitter.com/fWho3Ux7Oj
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Some countermeasures are easy, like only returning information about long chromosomal matches. Others, like requiring cryptographic signatures suggested by
@erlichya@itsikp@ShaiCarmi last year, are harder to implement but very effective (18/n)https://science.sciencemag.org/content/362/6415/690/tab-figures-data …Prikaži ovu nit -
We wrote to all the DTC genealogy services we know of that allow uploads 90 days ago to share these methods and the countermeasures we recommend. They all wrote back to us, and some of them told us that some of these countermeasures are already in place. (19/n)
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We’d encourage all services that might potentially be affected by these kinds of attacks to share the countermeasures they have in place publicly. (20/n)
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Genetic genealogy can be an amazing, empowering thing for people who want to find their biological relatives, including folks who wouldn’t be able to find them otherwise. Our goal (shared w/ the companies offering these services) is that people be able to do this safely. (21/n)
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And of course, this is all part of a larger conversation about how we as a society want our genetic information used and want our genetic privacy protected. (Add it to a list of reasons to
@extendGINA) (end)Prikaži ovu nit
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