David A. DaoudVerifizierter Account

3-Nasrallah: In the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Khomeini ordered Iranian forces from Artesh and IRGC to deploy to Syria and Lebanon to aid in repelling the Israeli invasion.

4-Nasrallah: Israelis halted their advance after seizing about half of Lebanon's territory. At the point, the orders of the Iranian forces changed from fighting the Israeli forces to establishing local resistance groups to fight the Israeli occupation

5-Nasrallah: Many of the forces returned to Iran, and part remained - those from the IRGC, in Syria and Baalbek. That was when the direct relationship and Lebanese scholars and youths was established, including Abbas Musawi, Imad Mughniyeh, and others.

6-Nasrallah: At that point, work began to establish groups throughout Lebanon to fight the Israeli occupation, and that's when the relationship started. At the time, there was no Quds Force, this came later. That later became our interlocutor, until today.

7-Nasrallah: I met Soleimani for the first time in Lebanon, in Beirut. He came to Lebanon after being appointed Quds Force commander (in 1998). I'd never met him before. He was deployed in different areas before that.

8-Nasrallah: Imad Mughniyeh, Badreddine were at the first meeting with Soleimani, and other Hezbollah members who I won't mention because they are still alive. Our first meeting was great and created a great first impression for future positive relationship.

9-Nasrallah: Imad Mughniyeh's appointment as head of Hezbollah's military forces was unrelated to Soleimani. This was an internal matter, and wasn't on Iranian orders.

10-Nasrallah: Mughniyeh was appointed, coincidentally, as Hezbollah's activities expanded and his new role became necessary.

11-Nasrallah: Mughniyeh and Soleimani didn't knew each other before Soleimani was appointed as Quds Force commander

12-Nasrallah: However, afterwards, he established personal friendships with many Hezbollah commanders. Same with members of Resistance Axis in Syria, Palestine, Iraq, etc.

13-Nasrallah: Soleimani has a stronger/special relationship with Imad Mughniyeh, like brothers or friends, as if they knew each other for decades. They would visit each other's homes and families. They became like old friends.

14-Nasrallah: Soleimani could have remained in his office in Tehran and given orders. Instead, he would visit operational fronts. We visited him infrequently. He would meet w/the fighters, go to the fronts, etc. which had positive impact on their morale, military operations

15-Nasrallah: Soleimani's hands-on approach gave him a more accurate understanding military situation, needs of fighters, battlefront, etc.

16-Nasrallah: Soleimani was tireless, unlike the rest of us who would succumb to pressure. He continued working even if he was tired, or in physical pain.

17-Nasrallah: He would only attend to his own physical/health needs after attending to military matters first. I've never met anyone else with his work ethic.

18-Nasrallah: He was insistent on not wasting time or procrastinating. If someone else would try to accomplish something in 5 yrs, he'd do it in 1. He was also extremely humble, and his military rank never inflated his ego.

19-Nasrallah: He never feared danger, and would always go to the forward positions of battle. I used to disagree with him on this, and advised him to act differently.

20-Nasrallah: We saw this during the 2006 war with Israel, when he came to Damascus, called us and told us he wanted to come to Dahiyeh in Beirut. We told him it wasn't possible, even roads didn't permit it. But he was insistent. He said he'd walk to us if we didn't get him.

21-Nasrallah: In Syria and Iraq, he was also on the frontlines when fighting ISIS. Generals usually are in the rear.

22-Nasrallah: Soleimani's cooperation w/Imad Mughniyeh had a big impact on 2000 south Lebanon liberation. Of course, our first victory over Israel was 1982-1985, when Israel withdrew to South Lebanon Security Zone.

23-Nasrallah: from 1985-1998, when Soleimani took control of Quds Force, Hezbollah's capabilities advanced, but at a slow pace. His assumption of command of Quds Force, and relationship w. Mughniyeh, had a positive impact.

24-Nasrallah: He came and assessed situation and deficiencies, and asked Iran for increased military assistance, better training. So, if you look at 1998-2000, you see qualitative, quantitative improvement of Hezbollah's operations. Soleimani also had constant follow-up.

25-Nasrallah: However, May 2000 victory was not result of 1998-2000 alone, but an accumulation of victories and capabilities since 1982. But these last two years definitely sped up matters.

26-Nasrallah: Soleimani would visit Lebanon ever 2 or 3 weeks, not months. He would come to Dahiyeh, and at times to south Lebanon. We would try to prevent him from going to the south Lebanon frontlines, but he always insisted on going.

27-Nasrallah: I met w/Khamenei, along w/Mughniyeh and Badreddine, prior to 2000 Israeli withdrawal. Our assessment was that the Israelis would not withdraw, even under fire, because it would encourage further attacks on them.

28-Nasrallah: This meeting occurred after Barak's promise to withdraw, but months before withdrawal. We thought Barak would not withdraw because he wanted guarantees from Syria, Lebanon, and they would not grant him that.

29-Nasrallah: Barak had option for unilateral withdrawal. But we didn't think this possible, because it would constitute a historical, strategic change.

30-Nasrallah: Khamenei advised us to plan for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal in any case, as a hypothetical scenario.

31-Nasrallah: However, Khamenei spoke with our military commanders afterwards, however, and told us we would soon win a huge victory, more imminent than some expect. He looked at me and smiled. He told us we'd all see this victory with our own eyes.