Conversation

Not everyone using an aftermarket OS wants to roll back the security model and disable security features. Proper verified boot is a small part of what we expect potential hardware partners to implement. It's not proper verified boot if firmware bypasses aren't fixed like this.
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You're welcome to use something other than GrapheneOS if you don't want the standard security model and hardware-based security features intact. Rollback protection is a basic security feature and has already been used for years, just not for the early SoC boot chain in practice.
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Verified boot is an important security feature primarily used to make privileged persistence much more difficult for an attacker. If they can simply write out a vulnerable SoC boot chain, it doesn't work. It's secondarily used for anti-tampering and the same thing applies to it.
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The primary threat model for verified boot is defending against a remote attacker trying to persist on the device, not physical security. Anti-tampering is a secondary and less important threat model for verified boot. Chromebooks don't really bother even trying to do that part.
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They can write out all the SoC and OS images. They can write out the oldest available compatible release of the boot chain firmware and other SoC firmware. They can push outdated firmware to components, etc. too. A used device would be far more scary without these features.
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